The differential effects of two forms of feedback on energy consumption behaviour were examined in two units of a metallurgical company. In one unit, employees received information about energy conservation, had to set goals and received feedback on their own conservation behaviour. The same procedure was followed with employees in a second unit, but they also received information about the performance of the first unit. In accordance with predictions from social identity theory and social comparison theory, the results clearly showed that employees in the comparative feedback condition saved more energy than employees who only received information about their own performance, even half a year after the intervention. A remarkable finding was that behavioural change took place with hardly any changes in attitudes or intentions. The discussion focuses on these findings and on their implications for organizational behaviour change in general.
Introduction
from their extra efforts to save energy. Thus, the main question becomes: how can a company motivate its employees to behave in a more energy-saving The consumption of energy results in economic and environmental costs such as resource shortages, way?
In the present study an attempt was made to inflation, air pollution, and radioactive wastes (Cone & Hayes, 1980) . Because of these costs, more encourage energy-saving behaviour by using comparative feedback. Employees in one unit of a metand more Western industrial organizations are investing in innovative physical technologies to allurgical plant were provided with information about the performance of another unit to see reduce energy consumption, for example, by insulating buildings, by purchasing or modifying equip-whether this comparative feedback resulted in extra energy savings after both units had particiment, and by using energy-saving devices. However, these energy consumption-reducing investments pated in a behavioural change programme containing educational information, task goal assignment, are not worth much unless employees handle apparatus and equipment in such a way that less energy feedback, and supervision and control. Previous organizational research (Siero et al. 1989 ) has is wasted. Hence, an important question is how energy-related organizational behaviour can be shown that such a behavioural change programme is an effective tool to motivate employees to reduce changed effectively.
Research on energy conservation in family house-their energy-wasting behaviour. In the following section, we discuss the potential of comparative holds has shown that as a result of behavioural modifications, savings of up to 30 per cent can be feedback for reducing energy-wasting behaviour.
Subsequently, attention will be given to the realized (Seligman & Darley, 1977; Geller et al. 1982) . However, generalization of these findings to elements of the behavioural change programme. the workplace is problematic because expenditures related to energy use are usually experienced more Comparative feedback directly in a household, and, in the context of an organization, employees profit only indirectly Receiving information about the performance of other groups can lead to several group-dynamic back could not be controlled beforehand. Generally, when subjects in a group perform better than the consequences. First, comparative feedback emphasizes the existence of the own group. By making subjects in another (comparison) group, they may remain motivated to devote themselves to the group people conscious of the existence of another group with whom they may compare themselves, their goal; in which case, subjects can derive a positive self-image from the feedback. If group members perown group is made more salient. According to social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978) , people will in general form worse than subjects in a comparison group, they will try to improve their group performance in strive for a positive self-image. Their membership in a group is itself perceived as part of their ident-order to maintain a positive identity. However, in the case of a continuing bad performance, comparaity. Research in this area (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) has shown that emphasizing the social identity of tive feedback can also have negative effects. Under competitive conditions, people tend to avoid comindividuals leads to a strong personal identification with one's own group which can have various parisons with others who perform better (Dakin & Arrowood, 1981; Van Knippenberg et al. 1981) . psychological and behavioural consequences. For example, stronger identification manifests itself in When their own performance is worse than the performance of the comparison group for a long period a positive evaluation of fellow group members (Wilder, 1986) . Wit and Wilke (1988) found that of time, while members of the group are doing their utmost, they are confronted with unwanted inforstressing the common group identity led to more cooperative behaviour, while there was no compen-mation. The opportunity to attain a positive selfevaluation is lacking under those circumstances, sation in terms of individual benefits. In the context of organizational behaviour, this is an interesting which may result in demoralization and decreased performance. Thus, because of the indistinctness of outcome because employees are asked to change their behaviour to benefit the company.
the direction of the comparative feedback in the present study, it is not evident in advance what effect Another consequence of comparative feedback could be that the information about the outcomes of comparative feedback will have on group performance. In the case of chronically worse performance other groups leads to competitive feelings and a striving for better performance. Such normative within the comparative feedback condition, dividing the employees in a better performance group and a information can be given in several ways. For example Shalley et al. (1987) and Jackson and worse performance group would be necessary to differentiate between the effects of prevailing upward Zedeck (1982) allowed subjects to believe, among other things, that their performance would be com-comparison and the effects of prevailing downward comparison. pared with the performance of other subjects; the expectation that their performance would be compared was a sufficient condition to improve task Behavioural change programme performance. Additional empirical evidence was found by Mitchell et al. (1985) who demonstrated In an attempt to change the driving behaviour of employees of a large transport organization, Siero et that presenting information about the performance of others on a wall chart resulted in better task per-al. (1989) found that a programme containing educational information, task goal assignment, feedformance. Comparative feedback appears to promote competitive feelings, increased attention to back, and supervision and control could significantly change employees' driving cognitions and feedback information, and a striving to perform better than the other group. In the present study, behaviour in a positive, energy-saving direction.
These four strategies will be explained below. this competitive orientation was expected to motivate employees to try to reduce the number of As the first step in the behavioural change process, an organization has to tell its employees that energy-wasting actions within their own group. Both elements of comparative feedback, emphasiz-it wants different behaviour and why. By means of an educational campaign, the company can try to ing the common identity through comparative feedback and the competitive context, were expected to expand knowledge, to change incorrect beliefs and attitudes, and to motivate employees to behave in result in more energy-saving behaviour in the comparative feedback condition than in the condition in an energy-saving way (cf. Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; McGuire, 1985) . However, providing information is which only a standard behavioural change programme was provided.
necessary but seldom sufficient for behavioural change to occur. Especially in the case of workHowever, there was a complicating factor in this field study: the direction of the comparative feed-related behaviour, tasks and activities often have a routine-like character and become habits which package would result in an extra reduction of energy-wasting behaviour, which is attended by an might impede behavioural change. In order to change this type of behaviour, at least a combi-enhancement of competitive feelings and identification with their own group. By measuring attination of goal-setting and regular feedback about goal achievement is necessary.
tudes, social norms and reported behaviour, it is possible to check the cognitive effects from the Second, when it comes to changing behaviour in an organizational context, one generally has to refer addition of comparative feedback to the basic programme. However, with the exception of reported to collective rather than individual interests. By assigning a common performance goal, an organiz-behaviour, specific cognitive effects were not expected. It is obvious that the expected behavation can motivate individuals to work for the general organizational interest. A number of studies ioural effects of comparative feedback should also be visible in reported energy-saving behaviour. have shown that the higher the performance goal and the more precise this goal has been formulated, the better the performance will be (Locke et al. 1981; Locke & Latham, 1990; Smith et al. 1990; Method Siero & van Oudenhoven, 1995) . A difficult goal supposedly challenges people to do their utmost, Participants and precise goals give information about the direction people have to give to their efforts. For goals to The participants were employees of two units of a metallurgical company. The two units were located be effective, a person has to accept the goals and consider the goals feasible.
in different parts of the Netherlands (distance: 200 miles). Both units had a high degree of freedom of In addition, goal-setting should be accompanied by feedback. Applied to the topic of the present action and were principally self-supporting, which was formalized in an incorporated partnership. Furresearch, employees can utilize concrete feedback about energy-saving results for 'temporal compari-thermore, each unit had its own personnel department, technical department, and production departsons' (Wood, 1989) : how well do I perform in comparison with earlier results, and how well do I per-ment. Both units consisted of four hierarchical sections. The daily management was conducted by a form in comparison with the task goal?
Finally, when members of an organization once unit manager. Middle managers, who were under the jurisdiction of the unit manager, were responshow the desired energy conservation behaviour, this behaviour has to be retained and will eventu-sible for a part of the total production. The next hierarchical section consisted of first-line managers ally become more or less a habit. Initially, the organization will actively have to supervise and con-who gave guidance to one production department.
The organizational structure and the educational trol the behaviour of its members until the behaviour is retained without the need for continued background of the managers was identical within both units. In general, production employees had a control.
Thus far we have discussed a set of four stra-low educational level. At the time the study was conducted, many employees had been employed in tegies a company can use for the promotion of energy-saving behaviour among its employees. We the same job for more than 20 years. have defined this whole set of interventions as a behavioural change programme because the inter-Design and procedure ventions cannot be seen in isolation. For example, task goal assignment will not be very effective with-A preliminary analysis showed that both units were highly comparable with respect to production proout feedback. Moreover, a certain amount of supervision and control will always be needed.
cesses, communication channels and structure, as well as personnel characteristics and organizational In the present research, one unit of the company received all the elements of this behavioural change strategy. This comparability of units enabled us to apply a quasi-experimental design. The basic proprogramme. This 'basic programme group' only received feedback about the performance of their gramme ('the campaign'), consisting of educational information, goal-setting and feedback, and superown group. In the comparative feedback condition, employees also received information about the vision and control, was given to both units. In addition to this, the second unit received comparaenergy-saving performance of the other group. Our main hypothesis was that the addition of the com-tive feedback. Unit members were not told that there was a difference in intervention. parative feedback to the four elements of the basic Besides the similarities between the two units, was given over a period of 12 weeks by means of energy bulletins and announcements in the comthey differed in sample size; n=135 for the basic programme condition and n=50 for the comparative pany's magazine. During these weeks, employees successively received information about the social feedback condition. The potential confounding of this difference with the intended difference in feed-aspects and economical consequences of energysaving behaviour, about the consequences of back is dealt with in the 'Results' and 'Discussion' sections.
energy-saving behaviour related to workstation lights, heating, and compressed air and machine Because the company only utilized a rough measure of energy consumption, we recorded use. The selection of the consequences was based on pretest data related to perceived advantages and energy-wasting behaviour instead of actual energy consumption. The presence or absence of energy-disadvantages of saving energy.
In order to set a feasible performance goal, an wasting behaviour around a large number of objects (such as drilling, rolling and bending of steel, accurate estimate of the potential savings was needed. The potential savings were assessed by calworkstation lights, assembling) was measured during 10 weeks (September-November). Shortly culating the percentage of the total number of observations that could be classified as energybefore the campaign began, the employees filled out a questionnaire about their energy-saving behav-wasting behaviour (see 'Dependent Variables'). To arrive at a compromise between the highest possible iours, related attitudes (behavioural beliefs and outcome evaluations), and social norms (normative percentage of energy-saving behaviour and a feasible amount of savings, the performance goal beliefs and motivation to comply). During the campaign, employees received information about energy was set among employees of another unit of the same company. 1 They considered 75 per cent of the savings and each week they were confronted with their energy-saving performance on the basis of total potential savings feasible. Thus, if, for example, the percentage potential savings was 60 observations of their energy-wasting behaviour (feedback).
per cent, the goal would have been achieved if only 15 per cent of the observations (0·25×60%) could be The campaign lasted 20 weeks (NovemberMarch). Immediately after, a second questionnaire classified as energy-wasting behaviour.
The feedback consisted of weekly graphic displays was administered to assess possible changes in reported behaviour, behavioural beliefs, and atti-of saving results for the whole unit over all behaviours which were updated weekly. Savings were tude. Questions about evaluations of behavioural consequences were left out because of the extremity expressed in percentages of the total potential of energy savings. One hundred per cent savings and low standard deviation of the pretest responses. Questions about the elements of the basic pro-implied that there were no wasteful actions, 75 per cent savings indicated that the goal was realized, gramme and about comparative feedback were added to gain insight into the quality of the and zero per cent savings indicated that the behaviour was as wasteful as during the pretest. The implementation. Observations of energy-wasting behaviour immediately after the end of the cam-graphic display also presented the task assignment line, from which it was easy to deduce the distance paign (first post-test; April) and a half year later (second post-test: September) provided information between actual behaviour and goal performance. To make the feedback more specific, they were also about the short-term and long-term behavioural effects of the basic programme and the additional given precise digital information about two energy consumption behaviours, namely, turning off behavioural effects of comparative feedback. Time of measurement of pretest, post-test, and start and workstation lights and compressed air leakages.
These data could be read beneath the graphic disend of the campaign was identical for both conditions. play. To avoid information overload, no specific feedback was given about shutting off machines, or about the remaining energy consumption Independent variable behaviours. At the start of the campaign, a number of agreeBoth units received a basic programme. The addition of comparative feedback to one of the two ments were made with the first-line managers to motivate energy-saving behaviour and to supervise units defined the independent variable. and control the employees. They were responsible for the energy consumption behaviour within their Basic programme. General and specific educational information about energy-saving behaviour department. Unit and middle managers were responsible for their own units and workstations Dependent variables respectively.
Energy-wasting behaviour. Energy-wasting behaviour was measured with a Multi Moment Recording Comparative feedback. To effectuate comparative feedback, the second unit received information (MMR) technique. Around the selected objects, the observations related to shutting off machines, turnabout the saving results of both their own unit and two other units, namely, the unit in which the ing off workstation lights, reporting compressed air leakages, 2 and a remaining set of energy consumpemployees received only the basic programme and a third unit of the same company which was not tion behaviours, such as disconnecting electrical equipment, turning off the general lights and preinvolved in this study (see Note 1).
Because the feedback data were production-and venting heat loss by closing doors and windows. Within the unit that only received the basic proseason-independent and related to the saving potential per unit, the second unit was able to com-gramme, 79 objects were observed: 35 objects for shutting off machines, 33 objects for turning off pare its own performance with the performance of the other units in a meaningful way. The infor-station lights, and 11 objects for the remaining set of energy-wasting behaviours. In the comparative mation about the savings results of the two other units were added weekly to the graphic display, feedback unit, 69 objects were observed: 23 objects for shutting off machines, 34 objects for turning off together with the savings results of their own unit.
station lights, and 12 objects for the remaining set of energy-wasting behaviours.
Implementation variables
Using the MMR technique, an observer registered, for each object on randomly chosen days and Basic programme. In order to check the implementation of the four strategies of the basic programme, at randomly chosen moments, the presence or absence of an employee and the energy consumption employees were asked whether they agreed with a number of statements on a 5-point scale, ranging (machines on or off, workstation lighting on or off, etc). By dividing the frequency of observed energyfrom (1) 'disagree' to (5) 'agree'. They were asked to what extent they knew about the reasons for the wasting behaviour ('absent and on') by all observed behaviours ('absent and on' plus 'absent and off'), energy savings campaign (knowledge; one item), they talked with their colleagues about the saving the percentage of energy-wasting behaviour could be assessed. The observations were made by the results displayed on the charts (communication; one item), and they understood how to realize energy company itself.
Given sufficient observations and a random savings (insight; three items, Cronbach's α=0·87). In addition, they were asked to what extent there choice of days and moments, the MMR technique guarantees accurate estimates of the percentages of was contingency between their effort and the feedback about their energy savings (for example, 'Multi energy-wasting behaviour. In order to assess the reliability, we calculated the agreement between Moment Recording was a good measure of my contribution to energy saving'; four items, Cronbach's the observations of two independent observers during one day. The agreement between them was α=0·81), their acquaintance with (one item) and their perception of the attainability of the task goal remarkably high: 96·3 per cent of the 1016 observations were identical. (one item), and the level of supervision and control they experienced (with respect to energy saving in Preceding the interventions, a baseline of energywasting behaviour was recorded in both units under general and with respect to shutting off machines, turning off workstation lights, and reporting com-study during a 10-week time period. All selected objects were observed at 10 random moments on 2 pressed air leakages; four items, Cronbach's α= 0·87).
arbitrary days per week. During the intervention period (20 weeks) and post-tests, the same observations were made, but at that time on only 1 day a Comparative feedback. The success of the comparative feedback manipulation was checked by the week. The first post-test lasted 4 weeks and took place immediately after the last intervention. A half following questions (1 = disagree, 5 = agree): 'I am curious to know about the saving results of the year after the last intervention, the second post-test was conducted lasting 5 weeks. other units' (curiosity), 'I was aware of the saving results of the other units' (feedback-awareness), and 'I think that my unit should save more energy than Reported behaviour. Reported behaviour was assessed by three questions (1=never, 5=very often): the other units' (competition).
'Do you pay attention to energy savings within your Results company?', 'Do you immediately report a compressed air leakage to your supervisor, as soon as Implementation checks you detect it?', 'Do you turn off the workstation lights as soon as possible?', and 'Do you shut off Basic programme. This manipulation was relatively straightforward. On the whole, the responses machines as soon as possible?' These variables were also combined in one index for reported behaviour to the specific statements about the four elements of the programme indicated that the implementation with a Cronbach's α of 0·69, reflecting a reasonable internal consistency (cf. Nunnally, 1978, p. 245) .
was successful (mean scores above 3·0 points to agreement). Concerning the educational information, employees reported knowing about the Identification. Their identification with the colleagues and with their own unit was measured with reasons for the energy savings campaign (M=4·1), and understanding how to realize energy saving the following statement: 'If I had the opportunity to choose, I would again cooperate with the same col-(M=3·8). In addition, they perceived the contingency between their effort and the feedback they received leagues' (1=disagree, 5=agree). about their energy-saving behaviour (M=3·3). Employees knew about the task goal (M=3·8) and Attitude. Attitude towards saving energy was measured by asking for the evaluations about shut-perceived the goal as attainable (M=3·6). They experienced a relatively moderate level of superting off machines, about turning off workstation lights, and about reporting compressed air leakages vision and control (M=2·5), and they reported that they did not communicate intensively with their col-(three items: Cronbach's α=0·79). Behavioural beliefs (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980) were measured by leagues about the saving results on the charts (M= 3·0). employees' perceived probability of consequences of energy-related (saving or energy wasting) activities
With the exception of the elements of performance goal and of supervision and control, the (−2=very unlikely, 2=very likely). Four consequences were used for each of the three behaviours. implementation of the basic programme was the same in the two experimental conditions. AcquaintThree consequences were identical for the three behaviours, namely 'yields energy savings', 'leads to ance with and perceived attainability of the performance goal was higher in the comparative feeda reduction in the waste of materials', and 'leads to appreciation of the supervisor'. For shutting off back condition than in the basic programme condition: for 'acquaintance' (M=4·3 vs M=3·4 (F(1, machines, the consequence 'leads to extra wear in switches' was added. For turning off workstation 69)=12·6, p<0·001)) and for 'perceived attainability' (M=4·0 vs M=3·2 (F(1, 69)=14·5, p<0·001)). In view lights and for reporting compressed air leakages, the consequence 'yields less costs for the company' of the possibility that extra attention was paid to the performance goal in the context of the comparawas added. To assess outcome evaluations (only pretest; see 'Design and Procedure'), employees were tive feedback manipulation, these differences are not surprising. Moreover, employees in the comasked to evaluate the consequences on a 5-point scale ranging from (−2) 'very bad' to (+2) 'very good'. parative feedback condition experienced less supervision and control than employees in the basic programme condition: (M=2·1 vs M=3·0; F(1, 78)=16·5, Social norms. The social norm was measured for turning off workstation lights and for reporting p<0·001). compressed air leakages. The social norm was calculated by summing the products of normative Comparative feedback. Employees in the comparative feedback condition were more curious to know beliefs and motivation to comply (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980) . Normative beliefs were assessed by asking about (M=3·9) and better aware of the savings results of the other unit (M=3·6) than employees in employees, for each of the two behaviours, how positive two referents, namely, their supervisor and the basic programme condition, (M=3·3 and M=2·3, respectively); for 'curiosity' (F(1, 71)=6·5, p<0·05) their colleagues, would evaluate their energysaving behaviour (1=absolutely negative, 5=absol-and for 'awareness' (F(1, 71)=24·0, p<0·001) . In addition, the comparative feedback group (M=4·4) utely positive). Motivation to comply was measured by asking for each behaviour on a 5-point scale, to indicated they were more competitive than the basic programme group (M=3·8, F(1, 71)=6·0, p<0·05). what extent employees cared about the opinion of the supervisor and of colleagues (1=not at all, 5=
There was no indication for any nonequivalence between the two conditions at the start of the camvery strongly).
paign. The two conditions (the units) did not differ condition, differed in their reported behaviour from pretest to post-test (simple main effect: F(1, 180)= on the mean pretest scores on any of the cognitive variables (attitudes, social norms, and reported 10·5, p<0·001). As predicted, they reported behaving in a more energy-saving manner after the cambehavior).
paign. Finally, as predicted, employees within the two conditions show a differential change from preEffects of comparative feedback test to post-test in their identification with their own unit. As depicted in Table 1 , this interaction Cognitive effects. A comparison of the mean scores (F(1, 167)=5·0, p<0.03), particularly means that the on behavioural beliefs, on attitude, and social norms identification with the own unit decreased from preabout shutting off machines and switching off lighttest to post-test for the employees within the basic ings between the two conditions before and after the programme condition (simple main effect: F(1, campaign revealed only an effect of the intervention 167)=7·4, p<0·01). on the behavioural beliefs that these habits resulted in energy savings. As can be seen in Table 1 , after the intervention, the mean scores within the comparative feedback condition differed from the means Behavioural effects. The impact of both the basic programme and the addition of comparative feedwithin the basic programme condition. After the campaign, employees who received comparative back is remarkable with respect to each of the three types of energy-wasting behaviours, namely shutfeedback (vs the basic programme condition) had a stronger belief that shutting off machines and turn-ting off machines, switching off workstation lights, and the remaining set of energy-related behaviours. ing off workstation lights resulted in energy savings. This contrast between the two conditions The assessment of energy-wasting behaviour was in contrast to the other measures, object-oriented and on the pretest is supported by a significant interaction for the behavioural belief about shutting off not individual-oriented. As mentioned above, it was based on the observation that, for example, workmachines (F(1, 168)=3·9, p<0·05) and for the behavioural belief about turning off workstation lights station lights were unnecessarily turned on (lights on and employee absent); no record was made of (F(1, 168)=3·1, p<0·08). As predicted, inspection of the simple main effects revealed significant differ-who was absent. The percentages of energy-wasting behaviour for each object, observed weekly from the ences between the two experimental conditions after the campaign for both behavioural beliefs: for start of the intervention, were, for the sake of the analysis, aggregated into six periods, i.e. four intershutting off machines (F(1, 168)=6·7, p<0.01), and for turning off workstation lights (F(1, 168)=9·5, p< vention periods of 5 weeks each, the first post-test of 4 weeks, and the second post-test of 5 weeks. The 0·01).
In addition, the mean scores in Table 1 show dif-energy-relevant behaviours before the campaign (pretest) and during these six periods are graphiferences between the two conditions before and after the campaign on the combined index for cally presented in Figures 1 to 3 . These figures show the percentage of energy-wasting behaviour reported behaviour: (F(1, 180)=3·7, p<0·06) . Inspection of this interaction revealed that the employees with regard to shutting off machines, turning off workstation lights, and remaining energy consumpwithin the comparative feedback condition, in contrast to the employees within the basic programme tion behaviours before, during, and after the inter- ventions for the basic programme condition and for the comparative feedback condition. The pretest data for shutting off machines showed that, when possible, employees did regularly shut off machines before the interventions. The percentage of energy-wasting behaviour was relative low: 16·1 per cent in the basic programme condition and 8·7 per cent in the comparative feedback condition. We expected that the addition of comparative feedback to the basic programme would lead to an extra reduction of energy-wasting behaviour. Indeed, in spite of the lower level of wasting energy before the start of the campaign, the comparative feedback unit showed a stronger decline in the percentage of energy-wasting behaviour than the basic programme unit. A multivariate type of intervention as the independent variable comparative feedback (-ᮀ-). and four times measures as dependent variables (pretest, mean score on the four intervention measures, and first and second post-test) revealed that the percentage of energy-wasting behaviour in this condition turned out to approach the percentage of intervention type had a highly significant multivariate effect on the percentage of energy-wasting wasteful behaviour before the start of the campaign.
At the start of the campaign, the employees in behaviour related to shutting off machines from the pretest to the second post-test (F(3, 54)=3·54, p< both conditions showed a high level of energy-wasting behaviour related to turning off workstation 0·05). Inspection of the univariate tests for the linear, quadratic, and cubic trend variables showed lights: 68·9 per cent in the basic programme condition and 74·1 per cent in the comparative feeda significant effect for the linear trend (F(1, 56)= 6·78, p<0·05). The mean percentages of energy-back condition. The multivariate test on the differences between the four time-measures (pretest, wasting behaviour related to shutting off machines for the two conditions are depicted in Table 2 and in mean score on the four intervention measures, and first and second post-test) showed a dramatic differ- Figure 1 . Employees in the comparative feedback condition reduced their energy-wasting behaviour ence in the decline of wasteful behaviour between the basic programme condition and the comparative from pretest (M=8·7) to the second post-test (M=1·5) even more than their task goal (i.e. 75% of the per-feedback condition (F(3, 63)=12·55, p<0·0001) .
Inspection of the univariate test results indicated centage of wasteful behaviour during the pretest = 2·2%). The decline in energy-wasting behaviour that these differences must be ascribed to a linear trend effect (F(1, 65)=38·5, p<0·0001). The mean within the basic programme condition is less dramatic and less permanent; employees even showed percentages in Table 3 and Figure 2 show that employees in the comparative feedback condition a rise in wasteful behaviour from the first to the second post-test. Six months after the campaign, were able to reduce their energy-wasting behaviour The task goal for the basic programme condition was a reduction to 4·0 per cent and for the comparative feedback condition, a reduction to 2·2 per cent energy-wasting behaviour. . Energy-wasting behaviour with regard to remaining energy consumption behaviours before, during, switching off lights before, during and after the interventions (Int) with the programme (--) and with and after the interventions (Int) with the programme (--) and with comparative feedback (-ᮀ-). comparative feedback (-ᮀ-).
from 74·1 per cent (pretest) to 22·6 per cent (second feedback condition 34·1%, see Table 4 ), the comparative feedback also encouraged the employees to post-test). In contrast, the energy savings of employees who received the basic programme fell reduce their energy-wasting activities within the remaining category of energy-related behaviour (to back to the level of the pretest after a temporal reduction of energy-wasting behaviour. 11·9%). Employees in the basic programme condition reduced their energy-wasting behaviour to a Starting with a moderate level of energy-wasting behaviour in both conditions (in the basic pro-lesser degree (from 34·4 to 20·9%) after a temporal regression, immediately after the end of the camgramme condition 38·4% and in the comparative The task goal for the basic programme condition was a reduction to 17·2 per cent and for the comparative feedback, condition a reduction to 18·2 per cent energy-wasting behaviour. The task goal for the basic programme condition was a reduction to 9·6 per cent and for the comparative feedback condition, a reduction to 8·5 per cent energy-wasting behaviour.
paign. The differences between the two conditions energy-related behaviour, and small-unit employees may experience a stronger sense of commitment. As on the four time measures were multivariate significant (F(3, 19)=3·27, p<0·05) . Owing to the a consequence, it might have been easier to address the smaller unit as a group than the larger unit. capricious pattern of energy-wasting behaviour within the basic programme condition (see Figure However , these explanations do not seem to be very plausible because the results showed that the 3), the multivariate effect has to be ascribed to a cubic trend effect (F(1, 21)=8·94, p<0·01) .
degree of communication about energy savings and sense of commitment did not differ between the two units. Moreover, the finding that employees in the comparative feedback condition did perceive less Discussion external control from the management than employees in the basic programme condition shows In the present study, we examined how energy consumption behaviour could be reduced through com-that unit size-related variables are not responsible for our findings. It is also not very likely that parative feedback in an industrial organization. In one unit of a metallurgical plant, employees employees in the comparative feedback condition were more motivated to save energy at the start of received a basic programme intervention consisting of information about energy conservation, goal-set-the intervention than the basic programme employees, because initial attitudes were the same ting, and feedback on their own conservation behaviour. In addition to this basic programme, for both units. Finally, the initial differences in energy-saving behaviour between the two units employees in another unit received comparative feedback about the performance of two other units. were small and, in view of the lower level of energy waste in the comparative feedback unit, inhibited The most important finding of the present study was that comparative feedback had a much larger rather than facilitated energy savings.
Thus, the larger amount of energy savings of the impact on energy-wasting behaviour than the basic behavioural change programme. The results clearly comparative feedback unit can be ascribed to the motivational effect of comparative feedback. That showed that employees in the comparative feedback condition saved more energy than employees who the comparative feedback manipulation was straightforward and the comparative information only got information about their own performance. The effectiveness of comparative feedback is strik-encouraged employees to save energy is evident: compared to the employees from the basic proing considering the fact that the basic behavioural change programme by itself resulted in significant gramme condition, employees who received comparative information were more curious to know energy savings. Even after 6 months, the overall reduction in energy-wasting behaviours within the how the other unit performed, and they indicated that they were well-informed about it. They were unit which only received the basic programme was still nine per cent compared to the situation before also more competitive.
Thus, comparison information creates a competithe intervention.
At this point, an important question is whether tive orientation that encourages employees to perform almost always better than employees who the remarkable reduction of energy-wasting behaviours can be uniquely ascribed to the comparative receive only a basic package of measures, consisting of educational information, intragroup feedback, feedback information. Although there were no indications for any difference between the two con-and goal-setting. They saved more energy with respect to all energy-related behaviours. However, ditions on the main dependent variables before the start of the campaign, possible alternative expla-it does not seem very likely that the large effect of comparative feedback was only caused by the nations for the behavioural effects of comparative feedback could result from the fact that the number rewarding aspect of winning a competition. In that case, one would have expected the effect to disapof employees in the unit which received comparative feedback was considerably smaller than the number pear as soon as the reward was omitted. A striking finding of the present study is that employees in the of employees in the unit that received the basic programme. This difference may have had an effect on comparative feedback condition were capable of continuing with the realized savings, even in the other variables. For instance, it is possible that employees who work in a relatively small unit talk absence of feedback. It seems likely that the introduction of comparative feedback also resulted in a more with each other (about energy matters) than employees who work in a large unit. In addition, a stronger identification with their own group. Following this reasoning, people will contribute extra small unit allows more supervision and control of efforts to distinguish their own group from the other employees' energy-related cognitions were already quite positive. group and will be intrinsically motivated to be economical with energy. Simultaneously, this results in Comparative feedback turns out to be a powerful strategy for changing the behaviour of employees a greater effort to contribute to the collective organizational interest. Because people perform the within organizations. The combination of concrete feedback about their own performance and about desired behaviour relatively often, they learn to behave that way and this results in new habits. the performance of other groups of employees results in a competitive orientation, and more effort This reasoning can explain why there was still a considerable reduction in energy-wasting behaviour from the employees, and leads to more energy savings which, even 6 months after the termination 6 months after the intervention.
The explanation that comparative feedback of the intervention, are considerably higher than before the start of the intervention. The additional employees were intrinsically motivated to be energy thrifty is supported by the finding that these impact of comparative feedback is remarkable in view also of the considerable energy savings from employees also realized savings on other behaviours, about which no feedback was given (i.e. shut-the basic programme. In line with earlier research (Siero et al., 1989) , the elements of the basic proting off machines and the remaining energy consumption behaviours). Obviously, there seems to be gramme (educational information, goal-setting and feedback, and supervision and control) contributed a transfer to other related behaviours. The goal in the feedback condition was also considered more to a significant reduction of energy-wasting behaviour, even 6 months after the end of the campaign. feasible than the goal in the basic programme condition. Employees felt competent to achieve the goal We think that the instruments which were discussed and studied in this research are in principle performance, indicating a large extent of internal control.
suitable for changing organizational behaviours other than energy consumption. A basic condition is As indicated in the introduction, it was not clear before the comparative feedback intervention that that the behaviour that has to be changed is accurately specified and measured in such a way that information about the performance of others would have a positive effect. Comparative feedback could employees perceive the feedback as reliable and contingent on their own behaviour. Only by also have resulted in demotivation if the own performance had continuously been worse than the specifying the behaviour in measurable, identifiable entities will it be possible to change behaviour effecperformance of the comparison group. The present results do not provide any insight into the possible tively. The interventions that have been described here, particularly comparative feedback, are effectnegative effect of comparative feedback as the employees in the comparative feedback group were ive instruments to motivate employees to change their behaviours, for example, with regard to safety, not confronted with the situation that they performed worse than other groups during a longer quality of work, and efficiency. period, despite extra efforts. Therefore, the results of this study do not imply that comparative feedback cannot lead to demoralization among Acknowledgements employees.
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